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Abstract A new concept of consistency for cost sharing solutions is discussed,
analyzed, and related to the homonymous and natural property within the rationing
context. Main result is that the isomorphism in Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory
64:178–201, 1994) pairs each additive and consistent single-valued mechanism with
a corresponding monotonic and consistent rationing method. Then this answers the
open question in Moulin (Econometrica 68:643–684, 2000; Handbook of social choice
and welfare. Handbooks in economics, pp 289–357, 2002) whether such notion for
cost sharing exists. The conclusion is that renown solutions like the average and serial
cost sharing mechanisms are consistent, whereas the Shapley–Shubik mechanism is
not. Average cost sharing is the only strongly consistent element in this class. The
two subclasses of incremental and parametric cost sharing mechanisms are further
analyzed as refinement of the main result.
Keywords Resource allocation · Cost sharing · Mechanism ·
(Parametric)rationing · Additivity
1 Introduction
A group of agents S have demands q = (qi )i∈S for a single perfectly divisible output
and corresponding production costs C(
∑
i∈S qi ) have to be shared. A solution is a
device that relates each such cost sharing problem to a vector x of individual cost
shares such that
∑
i∈S xi = C(
∑
i∈S qi ). In this paper we will scrutinize the solutions
for consistency, a property that is credited a fundamental role in decision problems in
various fields of economics and social choice theory—see, e.g. Thomson (2006) and
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Maschler (1990). The idea in the cost sharing context is the following: a subgroup M
of agents in S agree to the solution at hand, and ‘leave’ the cost sharing problem with
paying their share of the production cost. The solution is consistent if the remaining
agents in S\M can just apply the same device in the remaining or reduced cost sharing
problem without altering their individual cost shares. Following Young (1985, p. 19),
consistency is a self-similarity property which envisions an idea of fairness of solu-
tions at all levels of cooperation, for any subgroup of agents, according to which ‘no
subgroup should want to “re-contract”’.
Where for some models in the resource allocation literature the concept of consis-
tency is transparent and unambiguous (like in rationing, see Thomson 2001; Moulin
2002), for the cost sharing problem it is as ambiguous as the underpinning idea of
reduction. It may be seen self-evident to determine the reduced demand profile by
q∗ = qS\M , but it is not at all straightforward how to determine the corresponding
reduced cost function C∗. Moulin (2000) questions whether a concept for the cost
sharing model exists which is close to the spirit of consistency in the rationing frame-
work. This paper provides an affirmative answer. In particular, it contributes to the
literature by the way the ambiguity of choosing an appropriate reduction is by-passed.
When it is not clear which ‘reasonable’ reduction suits a consistent solution best, the
proposal is to keep all of them. In turn a solution μ is consistent if for any cost sharing
problem (q, C) under consideration a suitable reduction (qS\M , C∗) exists for each
set M ⊂ S under which the solution is self-similar, i.e. μS\M (q, C) = μ(qS\M , C∗).
Under such solution the agents may rationalize the old proposal of cost shares by
choosing an appropriate new reduced cost sharing problem. In absence of such reduc-
tion, the implementation of the cost sharing solution is problematic if agents hold
different opinions to which problem the solution must be applied.
1.1 Relation to the literature
This paper fits in the literature on resource allocation and in particular the axiom-
atic cost sharing literature which discusses structural and characterizing properties of
solutions; see e.g. Thomson (2001), Moulin (2002), and Koster (2009b) for general
overviews. The proposed property of consistency in this paper is different from that in
Sobolev (1973) and Davis and Maschler (1965), where the residual cost is considered
as the difference between total cost and remaining cost after the leaving coalition has
paid her share. Examples of this approach can be found in Moulin and Shenker (1994),
Kolpin (1994), Tijs and Koster (1998), and Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2007). This liter-
ature does not provide a concise discussion of consistency as a general property; the
presented ideas mainly serve the goal of characterizing solutions under consideration
and have therefore a limited say. This paper is closer to the literature following Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989). Here the residual cost is considered as the total cost minus
the total amount that the remaining agents would have to pay under the cost sharing
solution, where potential revision of the demands of the remaining agents is incorpo-
rated. Sudhölter (1998) explores Hart and Mas-Colell type of consistency for different
cooperative cost games, but which choice of cost game models the situation best is not
clear. Leroux (2007) advances by a more profound definition which respects the rich
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cost structure, but turns a homogeneous model into a heterogeneous one. This paper
tries to overcome some of the listed shortcomings.
1.2 Overview of the paper and summary of the results
Section 2 provides the basic model of homogeneous cost sharing, as well as the notion
of a solution in these contexts. The class of incremental mechanisms is introduced.
Section 3 introduces the idea of reduced cost sharing problem and defines the con-
cept of consistency for general solutions. Section 4 focuses on the special meaning
of consistency for the class of mechanisms with the properties of additivity and con-
stant returns, the class which is known to be isomorphic to the class of monotonic
rationing methods (see Moulin and Shenker 1994). Main result is Theorem 4.2, which
points out that this isomorphism also pairs the consistent additive mechanisms with
the consistent and monotonic rationing methods. Conclusion is that the serial- and
average cost sharing mechanism are consistent, and the Shapley–Shubik mechanism
is not. Theorem 4.5 pins down the average cost sharing mechanism as the unique addi-
tive mechanism that is strongly consistent, i.e. consistent with respect to all eligible
reductions. Then these notions of consistency sharply divide the three most popular
(additive) cost sharing solutions in the literature. The remaining subsections show how
results from the rationing literature may be invoked to obtain further refinements of
Theorem 4.2. Two classes are discussed, where we find the discussed renown con-
sistent mechanisms in the intersection. Section 4.2 discusses the class of consistent
incremental mechanisms and a characterization. Section 4.3 introduces the paramet-
ric cost sharing mechanisms as the cost sharing counterpart of parametric rationing.
These mechanisms are characterized using Young (1987) characterization of para-
metric rationing methods. Finally, Sect. 4.4 discusses the possibility of extending an
additive mechanism defined on 2-agent problems to a consistent mechanism; it turns
out that there is only one way of doing this.
2 The model and preliminaries
Consider a production facility for some perfectly divisible good Y , of which the tech-
nology is summarized by a cost function C : R+ → R+; C(y) denotes the minimal
(monetary) input to generate y units of Y . It will be assumed that C is nondecreasing
and there are no fixed costs, so that C(0) = 0. In addition we shall assume absolutely
continuous cost functions.1 This technical condition implies that a cost function is
differentiable almost everywhere with respect to the Lebesgue measure λ. By C ′ we
denote the marginal cost function, i.e., the function that coincides with the derivative
of C whenever the latter exists, and assumes the value 0 otherwise. In particular, C ′ is
is λ-integrable and costs for output level y may be expressed as C(y) = ∫ y0 C ′(t)dt .2
1 For such functions it holds that for all intervals [a, b] ⊂ R+ and ε > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that for every
finite collection of pairwise disjoint intervals (ak , bk ) ⊂ [a, b] , k = 1, 2, . . . , n with
∑n
k=1 (bk − ak ) < δ,
we have
∑n
k=1 | f (bk ) − f (ak )| < ε.
2 This follows by the Fundamental Theorem in Lebesgue (1904).
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The set of all cost functions is denoted by C. Special cost functions are the base
functions Bt defined for t ≥ 0 by Bt (y) = min{t, y}.
Denote by N the class of nonempty and finite subsets of the natural numbers, by
which we indicate the possible sets of agents in a cost sharing problem; throughout
the paper we take the set of agents to be S ∈ N , S = {1, 2, . . . , |S|}. A cost sharing
problem for S is an ordered pair P = (q, C) ∈ RS+ ×C. The interpretation of P is that
the agents in S jointly own the production facility, and q = (qi )i∈S summarizes the
individual demands of the agents for good Y ; then q(S) = ∑i∈S qi is produced and
cost C(q(S)) has to be shared. The set of all cost sharing problems for S is denoted
P S , and put P ≡ ⋃S∈N P S .
For any y ∈ RS+ and M ⊆ S the component yS\M ∈ RS\M+ will also be denoted by
y−M , or if M = {i}, by y−i . An element y ∈ RS+ is called vector of cost shares for
(q, c) ∈ P S if y(S) = C (q(S)).
A solution assigns to each cost sharing problem a set of cost shares. For instance,





∣ x(S) = C(q(S)), x(T ) ≤ C(q(T )), for all T ⊂ S
}
.
In this paper we will restrict our attention to single-valued solutions, which are called
mechanisms. Define (S) = {y ∈ RS+|y(S) = 1}. A mechanism μ is called an incre-
mental mechanism if for each q ∈ RS+ there are k ∈ N and vectors αS1 , αS2 , . . . , αSk ∈






C(x S ) − C(x S−1)
)
for all C ∈ C, (1)
and where 0 = x S0 ≤ x S1 ≤ . . . ≤ x Sk = q(S). The incremental mechanisms generalize
the incemental methods and random order mechanisms as in Weber (1988). Denote the
set of all mechanisms by M. Then the set MI of incremental mechanisms is included
in M. For M∗ ⊆ M the mechanisms in M∗ with the properties P1, P2, . . . , Pm is
denoted M∗(P1, P2, . . . , Pm).
2.1 Examples of cost sharing mechanisms
• The average mechanism μav is an incremental mechanism with
k = 1, x Sk = q(S), αSk =
q
q(S)
whenever q(S) > 0.
• Denote the permutations of S by (S). For q ∈ RS+ there is an ordering permuta-
tion σ ∈ (S) such that qσ(i) ≤ qσ( j) ⇔ σ(i) ≤ σ( j) for all i, j ∈ S. Then take
k = |S| and
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1/(|S| −  + 1) if σ(i) ≥ ,
0 else.
The corresponding incremental mechanism is the serial mechanism (Moulin and
Shenker 1992) which is denoted μsr.
• Let σ : N → N be a bijection. Take π ∈ (S) that preserves the ordering of agents
by σ , i.e., such that π(i) ≤ π( j) ⇔ σ(i) ≤ σ( j). The marginal mechanism μσ




qπ(p) and αSi = 1 ⇐⇒ π(i) = .
Then μσ (P) is the marginal vector with respect to the induced stand alone cost
game (see Young 1985, 1994). If no confusion arises it will be convenient to express
μσ (P) as μπ(P).
• The Shapley–Shubik mechanism μss (Shubik 1962) calculates the Shapley value





This mechanism is incremental for x S ’s generated by the pooled demands{q(U ) ∣∣U ⊆ S} and































Additional notation I X : R → {0, 1} is the indicator function with respect to
X ⊂ R, such that I X (t) = 1 ⇔ t ∈ X .
3 Consistency
Consider the cost sharing problem P = (q, C) for S = {1, 2, 3} where C(y) = y2
and q = (1, 2, 3). One way to look at P is that not only costs C(6) = 36 have to be
distributed, but also the total of instantaneous production of 6 units. Suppose that agent
2 is allocated 2 units in total, represented through the production levels in some (mea-
surable) set Y ⊂ [0, 6]. Then Y agrees with the cost share μ2(P) if only the aggregate




′(t) dt = μ2(P). In other words, a unit y ∈ [0, 6] is considered to have an
impact C ′(y) on total cost and the aggregate impact of agent 2 for receiving the units in
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Y is given by
∫
Y C
′(t) dt—the ultimate liability of agent 2 in P . For example, assume
average cost sharing so that the cost shares in P are given by μav(P) = (6, 12, 18).
Then the set Y = [2, 4] not only suffices the need for production of agent 2, but agrees
with her cost share as well since
∫
Y C
′(t) dt = 12 = μav2 (P). In a similar fashion the
sets
X = [0, 12
) ∪ [ 112 , 6] and Z =
[ 1
2 , 2
) ∪ (4, 112
)
match the demand of agents 1 and 3 with their respective cost shares. Note that
(X, Y, Z) is a partition of [0, 6].
Now assume agent 2 leaves the cost sharing problem, taking with her the set of units
Y and leaving μav2 (P) as contribution to the total cost of production. The reduced cost
function summarizes the cost structure of all production levels except for those that
are paid for by agent 2, i.e., the truncation of C over Y defined by
CY (y) =
{
C(y) if y ≤ 2,
C(y + 2) − 12 if y > 2.
There is no unique way according to define allocations of production levels matching












∪ ( 72 , 5
)
.




C(y + 1) − C(1) if y ≤ 4,
C(y + 2) − 12 if y > 4.
This idea of matching production levels to cost shares can be extended. Assume that
the produced units are handed out instantaneously, such that (a) agent 2 is assigned
a share ϕ2(t) of each produced unit t ∈ [0, 6], and, moreover, (b) that she contrib-
utes ϕ2(t)C ′(t) to the cost C ′(t) of this unit. Then, similar to the above examples,
ϕ agrees with both agent 2’s demand and cost share if the total allocation of units
equals
∫ 6
0 ϕ2(t) dt = 2 = q2 and the aggregate contribution toward total costs equals∫ 6
0 ϕ2(t)C
′(t) dt = 12 = μav2 (P).
Notice that the vector function ϕ(t) = ( 16 , 13 , 12
)
defines a production device accord-
ing to which for each agent the allocated units match the cost share simultaneously.
This function may be used to define the reduced cost function Cϕ,−2 corresponding
to a reduction by agent 2. First of all, note that (y) := ∫ y0 ϕ2(t) dt units of the first




Hence the remaining cost in y −(y) is Cϕ,−2(y −(y)) = Cϕ,−2( 23 y) which equals
the total cost of producing y units minus the contribution of agent 2, that is
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Cϕ,−2( 23 y) = C(y) −
y∫
0
ϕ2(t)C ′(t) dt = 23 y2 for all y ∈ [0, 6],
or Cϕ,−2(y) = 32 y2 for y ∈ [0, 4]. If we now define Cϕ,−2(y) = C(y + 2) − μav2 (P)
for y > 4, then (q{1,3}, Cϕ,−2) is also considered as reduction of P by agent 2.
3.1 Reduction and consistency, formal definitions
Suppose that for P = (q, C)∈P S and mechanism μ there is a mapping ϕ :
[0, q(S)] → (S) with the properties that for all i ∈ S
q(S)∫
0
ϕi (t) dt = qi , (2)
q(S)∫
0
ϕi (t)C ′(t) dt = μi (q, C) . (3)
Basically this means that ϕi can be taken to ‘represent’ agent i’s demand and cost
share: unit t is produced and agent i gets the fraction ϕi (t) of it at the price ϕi (t)C ′(t).
Then condition (2) is no more than translating that the total of allocated (partial) units
sum up to the agent’s demand, and (3) ascertains that the corresponding marginal costs
are in line with the proposed solution. Such mapping ϕ which matches demands and
cost shares for all agents simultaneously is called a reduction map for (μ, P). If a
reduction map for (μ, P) exists then P is called reducible with respect to μ.
Importantly, recall that ϕ sees to a disjoint allocation of units, just to ensure that
after an agent leaves the cost sharing problem, the remaining group of agents do not
need to bargain over the same units (see Lemma 5.3 ).3
Note that we allow for ϕ to depend on the cost sharing problem at hand. Below we
will discuss an important class of solutions where ϕ can be taken irrespective of the
cost sharing problem, like in the following example.
Example 3.1 For any cost sharing problem P = (q, C), ϕ(t) = q/q(S) defines a
reduction map for (μav, P).
Take a reduction map ϕ for (μ, P), i ∈ S. Let i be the primitive of ϕi such
that i (0) = 0. Then ϕ defines a reduced cost sharing problem for agent i , Pϕ,−i =(
q−i , Cϕ,−i
) ∈ P S\{i}, where Cϕ,−i ∈ C is implicitly defined on [0, q(S\{i})] by
Cϕ,−i (y − i (y)) =
y∫
0
(1 − ϕi (t)) C ′(t) dt for y ∈ [0, q(S)], (4)
3 I thank Justin Leroux for making this point.
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Cϕ,−i (y) = C(y + qi ) −
q(S)∫
0
ϕi (t)C ′(t) dt for y > q(S\{i}). (5)
The second line says that, beyond production levels q(S), the original cost function is
truncated by the cost paid by agent i .4 Moreover, note that Cϕ,−i is non-decreasing as





(1 − ϕi (t)) C ′(t) dt.
As we have seen before reductions are in general not unique; in fact, each cost
sharing problem can be associated uncountably many reductions. Then a concept of
consistency would be too restricted if it were confined to just one of these. To avoid
the ambiguity of choosing the proper reduction, μ will be called consistent if the
restriction of the vector of cost shares in the original situation is available for some
reduced cost sharing problem. This guarantees that the remaining agents can at least
choose a reformulation of the cost sharing problem which preserves the status quo
solution. If the status quo solution is stable irrespective of the choice of reduction,
then the solution is strongly consistent. Formally:
Consistency (CONS) For all P ∈ P S, there exists a reduction map ϕ for (μ, P)
such that μ−i (P) = μ(Pϕ,−i ) for all i ∈ S.
Strong Consistency (SCONS) μ is consistent and for all P ∈ P S, and all reduction
mappings ϕ for (μ, P), μ−i (P) = μ(Pϕ,−i ) for all i ∈ S.
Example 3.2 Below we will show that the marginal mechanisms μσ are all consistent.
However, they are not strongly consistent. To see that strong consistency is violated,
consider the problem P = (q, C) ∈ P{1,2,3} with C(y) = ∫ y0 I [0,1]∪[2,3](t)dt and
q = (1, 1, 1). If π is the identity permutation on {1, 2, 3}, μπ (q, C) = (1, 0, 1).
Then ϕ defined by ϕ(t) = ( I [2,3], I [1,2), I [0,1)) is a reduction map for (μπ , P), but
μπ2 (Pϕ,−1) = μπ2
(
q{2,3}, Cϕ,−1
) = 1 = μπ2 (q, C).
Example 3.3 Note that the reductions by agent 2 in the introductory example do not
affect the cost shares of agents 1 and 3, as long as μav is used. No matter the reduction,
μav always calculates the same cost shares for the remaining agents as it is a strongly
consistent mechanism. To see this, consider a cost sharing problem P = (q, C) ∈ P S
for S ⊆ N , and assume that q(S) > 0. Then P is reducible by t → q/q(S). Now take
i ∈ S and an arbitrary reduction map ϕ for (μav, P). Then
4 This is to ensure that the reduction is still absolutely continuous; another non-decreasing continuation
would serve the exposition just as well.
5 To see this, consider v,w ∈ [0, q(S\{i})], v < w. The mapping y → y − i (y) is non-decreasing,
so for v = y∗ − i (y∗) and w = y˜ − i (y˜), it must hold y∗ < y˜. Then Cϕ,−i (w) − Cϕ,−i (v) =
∫ y˜
y∗ (1 − ϕi (t))C ′(t) dt ≥ 0.
123
Consistent cost sharing 9









Standard in the literature is consistency as a stability notion with respect to reduction
by coalitions of agents rather than individuals. The former approach generalizes in a
natural way to coalitional consistency, by considering the collective of leaving agents
as a single agent. Consider a reduction mapping ϕ for (μ, P) where P = (q, C) ∈ P S .
The reduced cost sharing problem with respect to M and ϕ, Pϕ,−M = (qS\M , Cϕ,−M ),
is defined implicitly and in analogy to 4 by
Cϕ,−M (y − M (y)) =
y∫
0
(1 − ϕM (t))C ′(t) dt, (6)
where ϕM := ∑i∈M ϕi , and M is a primitive of ϕM such that M (0) = 0.
Coalitional Consistency For all P ∈ P S, M ⊆ S, there exists a reduction mapping
ϕ so that μ−M (P) = μ(Pϕ,−M ).
Below, it will be convenient to stick to the single-agent interpretation of consistency
and there is no loss of generality in doing so:
Lemma 3.4 μ is consistent iff μ is coalitionally consistent.
Note that the above concepts require that—given some (strongly) consistent solu-
tion—any cost sharing problem is reducible. Then this rules out the equal split mech-
anism μE(q, C) := C(q(S))/|S|, which is not consistent for the fact that it may not
be reducible.6
Nevertheless, below it will be argued that reducibility is actually not too much to
ask for. As in Tijs and Koster (1998) associate each P = (q, C) ∈ P S with the pessi-


















if y ∈ [0, q(S)] ,
C(y) if y > q(S).
(7)
The function C∗P is the decreasing rearrangement7 of C that relates each level of aggre-
gate demand y ∈ [0, q(S)] to a specific upper bound on costs, given by the maximum
of corresponding aggregate marginal cost on [0, q(S)]. Ryff (1970) implies that C∗P is
absolutely continuous and that it indeed belongs to C. Moreover, it is easy to show that
6 Koster (2009a,b) shows how consistency may be discussed in a framework without the assumption of
CR, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, under CR the general idea is equivalent to the one
under consideration.
7 See Hardy et al. (1959).
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C∗P is concave on [0, q(S)]. In particular, CORE∗(q, C) := CORE(q, C∗P ) = ∅ and in
general this set is large. Suppose that a vector of cost shares y is not in CORE∗(q, C).
Then there exists a coalition which may object against y, as it is supposed to contribute
more than can be justified by even the aggregated highest marginal costs. In this sense
the pessimistic core provides weaker incentive constraints than the stand alone core
(see, e.g. Sharkey 1982; Young 1985, 1994). Lemma 3.5 below shows that consistency
can only be a meaningful concept for solutions that are in line with the constraints
imposed by the pessimistic core.
Lemma 3.5
1. If μ(P) ∈ CORE∗(P) then (μ, P) is reducible.
2. If μ is consistent, then μ(P) ∈ CORE∗(P) for all P ∈ P .
Note that this does not mean a full characterization of the consistent solutions;
consistency by definition implies reducibility, but not the other way around. To see
this, consider the mechanism μ defined by
μ(P) =
{
μav(P) for P ∈ P S, |S| > 2
μsr(P) otherwise.
The mechanism so defined is reducible for any cost sharing problem P = (q, c) ∈ P S
with |S| > 2 (see Example 3.1). But a reduction from a 3-agent problem to a 2-agent
problem will change the cost shares for the remaining agents.
4 Characterizing consistent and additive cost sharing
The two main characterizing properties in the state of the art cost sharing literature are
additivity and constant returns. Additivity is propagated as an accounting convention,
allowing for the decomposition of a cost sharing problem in several cost components
without altering the final cost allocations. Constant returns declares price of the good
equal to marginal costs in case of linear cost functions. Formally, for mechanisms μ
we define:
Additivity (ADD) μ(q, C1 + C2) = μ(q, C1) + μ(q, C2) for all demand profiles
q and C1, C2 ∈ C.
Constant Returns (CR) μ(q, Cϑ) = ϑq for Cϑ ∈ C given by Cϑ(y) = ϑy for
some ϑ ∈ R+.
Note that μav, μsr, μss belong to M(ADD,CR), the class of all mechanisms with
both properties ADD and CR.8 Obviously, μe satisfies ADD but not CR.
We will now focus on the result of Moulin and Shenker (1994) which shows the
close connection between the elements of M(ADD,CR) and rationing methods. First
we will provide the necessary rationing terminology.
8 An excellent overview on additive cost sharing in the homogeneous model is Moulin (2002); non-additive
mechanisms are proposed and analyzed by, e.g., Tijs and Koster (1998), Koster (2002), and Hougaard and
Thorlund-Petersen (2001).
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A rationing problem for agents in S ⊆ N consists of a pair (q, t) ∈ RS+ × R+
such that q(S) := ∑i∈S qi ≥ t . Here q is usually interpreted as a vector of claims,
and t the amount to be divided. A rationing method r associates to any rationing
problem (q, t) ∈ RS+ × R+ a vector r(q, t) ∈ RS+ such that ri (q, t) ≤ qi for all
i ∈ S and ∑i∈S ri (q, t) = t . So, nobody is granted more than her claim while the
available amount is fully distributed. Then r is monotonic whenever t ≤ t ′ implies
r(q, t) ≤ r(q, t ′) for all t, t ′, q ∈ RS+. Then each such rationing method defines for
all q ∈ RS+ a monotonic (and continuous) path t → r(q, t) from 0 to q. Denote the
set of all monotonic rationing methods by R. We have the following:
Theorem 4.1 (Moulin and Shenker 1994) Define the mappings
r → μ : μ(q, C) =
q(S)∫
0
C ′(t) dr(q, t) for all C ∈ C, q ∈ RS+,
μ → r : r(q, t) = μ(q, Bt ) for all (q, t) ∈ RS+ × R+.
These define a linear isomorphism from R into M(ADD,CR) and back.
This theorem, formulated as in Moulin (2002), shows that each mechanism μ ∈
M(ADD,CR) is fully characterized through its rationing method r ; I shall conse-
quently write μ = μr . For instance, any incremental mechanism μ as in (1) with the
property of CR has a corresponding piecewise linear rationing method r such that
∂
∂t







in case x S = x S−1. Well-known in the cost sharing literature are the following mem-
bers of MI :
• μav corresponds to the proportional rationing method rp,
rp(q, t) =
{
0 if q(S) = 0,
q
q(S) t otherwise.
• μsr corresponds to the uniform gains method rug, rugi (q, t) = min{qi , ω}, where
ω solves
∑
j∈S min{q j , ω} = t .• μσ corresponds to the priority rationing method rσ : consider π ∈ (S) that pre-
serves the ordering of N by σ . Let k be the integer such that
∑k
j=1 qπ( j) ≤ t ≤∑k+1
j=1 qπ( j), then




qi for i = π(1), π(2), . . . , π(k),
t −
∑k
j=1 qπ( j) for i = π(k + 1),
0 otherwise.
If no confusion arises, we will also write rπ instead of rσ .
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• μss corresponds to the random priority rationing method is defined as the average
of all priority rationing methods, i.e., rrp(q, t) = 1|S|!
∑
π∈(S) rπ (q, t).
Direct consequence from Theorem 4.1 is that mechanisms in M(ADD,CR) yield
reducible problems always: if μ = μr then ϕ : [0, q(S)] → (S) defined through
ϕ(t) = ∂
∂t r(q, t) is a reduction map for (μ, P) for any P . So we observe two facts: (a)
the reduction map is special in the sense that it does not depend on the cost sharing prob-
lem at hand, and (b) this makes consistency a non-void concept within M(ADD,CR).
Moreover, for cost sharing problems (q, C) with C(y) = αy for some α ∈ R+ we
have, by Lemma 3.5, μ(q, C) ⊆ CORE∗(q, C) = {αq}. This shows that under ADD,
CONS implies CR.
4.1 The main results
Within the rationing context the idea of consistency is transparent and intuitive: a
rationing method r is called consistent if for all rationing problems (q, t) among
agents in S, r−i (q, t) = r(q−i , t − r j (q, t)) for all i ∈ S.9 Hence, consistency states
that with removing an agent from the cooperative S, and taking all the resources
that are allocated to this agent, renewed allocation of the remaining pieces within the
reduced society does not make a difference as long as r is used. As Moulin (2002)
puts it, ‘changing the status of an agent from active participant to passive expense
of resources does not alter the overall distribution’. Renown examples of consistent
rationing methods are rp, rug, rσ , while rrp is not consistent - see, e.g., Moulin (2002).
Within the context of Theorem 4.1, consistency smoothly transfers from the cost
sharing context to the rationing model and back. The mapping r → μr defines an
isomorphism between the consistent elements in R and M(ADD,CONS).
Theorem 4.2 μ ∈ M (ADD,CONS) if and only if μ = μr and r is a consistent and
monotonic rationing method.
Using the knowledge about the rationing methods underlying the above mentioned
cost sharing mechanisms we obtain:
Corollary 4.3 μsr, μav, and all marginal mechanisms μσ are consistent, but μss is
not.
Although the idea of reduction map is reminiscent of a rationing method, consis-
tency is not at all confined to additive cost sharing mechanisms only as Theorem 4.2
might suggest. On the contrary, the example below shows how to derive non-addi-
tive and consistent mechanisms, by the composition of the pessimistic transformation
of a cost sharing problem and a consistent and additive mechanism. In this case the
reduction map depends on the cost sharing problem at hand.
Example 4.4 Define the pessimistic marginal mechanism μσ,∗ by μσ,∗(q, C) :=
μσ (q, C∗P ) for P = (q, C). Then clearly μσ,∗ is not additive. We will show that
9 In fact the notion is usually defined in terms of general sets of agents leaving, but is derived from repeated
application of this statement.
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it is consistent. Assume that C is concave cost function, so that μσ,∗(q, C) =
μσ (q, C). Define a reduction mapping ϕ through ϕi := I Y (i), where Y (i) =[∑
j∈S:σ( j)<σ(i) q j ,
∑
j∈S:σ( j)≤σ(i) q j
]
for all i ∈ S. Then the reduced cost shar-




−i (q, C) = μσ−i (q, C) = μσ (q−i , Cϕ,−i ) = μσ,∗(q−i , Cϕ,−i ).
If C is not concave, we may basically apply the same reasoning to its decreasing
rearrangement C∗P . Let fP : [0, q(S)] → [0, q(S)] a λ-measurable mapping imple-
menting the rearrangement C∗P such that for all t ∈ [0, q(S)], (C∗P )′(t) = C ′( fP (t)).
Then a reduction mapping ϕ is defined for P by ϕi = I fP (Y (i)). By choice of the




−i (q, C) = μσ−i (q, C∗P ) = μσ (q−i , (C∗P )Y (i))
= μσ (q−i , (Cϕ,−i )∗P ) = μσ,∗(q−i , Cϕ,−i ).
Recall that μss is additive and not consistent. Then the above example can be taken
as proof of the logical independence of the properties additivity and consistency.
It can be shown that for non-trivial cost sharing problems P—with all posi-
tive demands—there are uncountably many reduction maps for (μ, P) when μ ∈
M(ADD,CR). In particular, a strongly consistent μ should be stable with respect to
all of these reductions—which turns out to be too demanding for mechanisms using
more than only the level of aggregate cost.
Theorem 4.5 μ ∈ M(ADD,SCONS) if and only if μ = μav.
4.2 Characterization of consistent incremental mechanisms
The most popular cost sharing mechanisms belong to the class of incremental mech-
anisms MI , which makes the result below worthwhile.
Proposition 4.6 Let μ ∈ MI (ADD,CR) be given by (1). Then μ satisfies CONS if
and only if for all S, q ∈ RS+, and i ∈ S it holds
μ(q−i , C) =
k∑
=1
α˜ {C(x˜) − C(x˜−1)} for all c ∈ C, (9)




(1 − αSpi )
(










αS (S \ {i})
if αS (S \ {i}) > 0,
0 else.
(11)
4.3 Characterization of parametric cost sharing
Note that, in the basic setup of our cost sharing model, except for the labeling of the
agents, it is only their individual demand that may influence a solution, ceteris paribus.
Then, if two agents can not be distinguished for these characteristics it is reasonable
that they be treated equally by the solution.
Equal Treatment (ET) qi = q j ⇒ μi (q, C) = μ j (q, C).
ET is implied by the anonymity property in Moulin and Shenker (1992). It can be
used to refine Theorem 4.1, see Lemma 5.4 in the Appendix.
A rationing method r is called continuous if it is jointly continuous in both argu-
ments, i.e., (q, t) → r(q, t) is continuous for all rationing problems (q, t). Such r is
then robust against small changes in the parameters defining the rationing problem.
For cost sharing mechanisms the approach is similar; a mechanism will be called con-
tinuous if small changes in demands and Bt cause only small changes in cost shares.
More specifically,
Continuity (CONT) The mapping (q, t) → μ(q, Bt ) is continuous on RS+ × R+.10
Note that within the context of Theorem 4.1 μ ∈ M(ADD,CR) is continuous if
and only if the corresponding rationing method is. We will use this fact in order to
characterize the cost sharing mechanisms related to parametric rationing methods that
we will now define.
Consider a mapping f : D → R be a real-valued function where D ⊂ R2 is a set
in R+ × [0,] for some  ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}. Assume that for (z, ω) ∈ D it holds that
f (z, 0) = 0, f (z,) = z and ω → f (z, ω) is non-decreasing and continuous. Then
for such an f there is a unique rationing method r such that ri (q, t) = f (qi , ω) where
ω solves
∑
i∈S f (qi , ω) = t . This r is then called the parametric rationing method
for f . See, e.g., Young (1987), Kaminski (2000), Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003)
for more examples and overviews.11 All earlier mentioned examples of consistent
incremental mechanisms are parametric.
Proposition 4.7 μ ∈ M(ADD,CONS,ET,CONT) if and only if μ = μr for some
parametric r .
Proof If r is parametric and μ = μr , then μ ∈ M(ADD,CONS) by Theorem 4.2.
Moreover, since any parametric method is continuous, by definition μr is continuous.
Finally ET is implied by Lemma 5.4. The other way around follows just as in Young
(1987), where the assumption of an infinite pool of agents is essential. In short, take
r with μ = μr as in Theorem 4.1. Then in particular r is continuous and Lemma 5.4
10 In order to avoid the hybrid character of CONT one may consider the replacement by two requirements,
continuity of the mappings t → μ(q, Bt ) and q → μ(q, Bt ).
11 Moulin (2002) focuses on discrete formulation of the problem and asymmetric priority rules.
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shows that r satisfies equal treatment. Now we are done by application of Theorem 1
in Young (1987). unionsq
4.4 Consistent extensions
Given a cost sharing mechanism defined for only 2-agent problems, it is natural to ask
whether it is possible to extend it in a consistent way to a mechanism for arbitrarily
finite sets of agents. The related problem for rationing methods has been partially
solved. Dagan and Volij (1997) show that any monotonic rationing method for 2-agent
problems allows for a unique average consistent method. And, moreover, whenever
a consistent extension exists, it must coincide with the average consistent method. In
particular this guarantees at most one consistent extension of a monotonic rationing
method for 2-agent problems. Thomson (2008) shows the claims-truncated propor-
tional rule as an example of a rationing method for 2-agent problems which cannot be
extended consistently. Then from Theorem 4.2 we deduce:
Corollary 4.8 For each μ¯∈M(ADD,CR) there is at most one μ∈M(ADD,CONS)
such that μ(P) = μ¯(P) for all P ∈ P S with |S| = 2.
For instance, this shows that there is at most one mechanism μ ∈ M(ADD,CONS)
extending serial- or average cost sharing for 2-agent problems, whereas there is no
such extension of the mechanism defined through the truncated claims proportional
method.
In principle, consistent cost sharing mechanisms can be constructed using the tech-
niques of Dagan and Volij (1997). Once the rationing method underlying the mecha-
nism for 2-agent problems is known, calculate the corresponding average consistent
extension and—if at all—the consistent mechanism results from Theorem 4.2.
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5 Appendix
Lemma 5.1 Let P = (q, C) ∈ P S and take y ∈ CORE∗(P). Then for each i ∈ S
there is a ∈ [0, q(S \ {i})] such that yi = C∗P (a + qi ) − C∗P (a).
Proof Let i ∈ S and define g : [0,∞) → R by g(t) = C∗P (t + qi ) − C∗P (t). Then
g(0) = C∗P (qi ) ≥ yi and g (q (S\ {i})) = C∗P (q(S)) − C∗P (q (S\ {i})) ≤ yi . The
latter inequality follows from the fact that y ∈ CORE∗ (q, C) since C∗P (q(S)) = y(S)
and C∗P (q (S\ {i})) ≥ y (S\ {i}). Recall that C∗P is concave and thus continuous. Then
by continuity of g there exists a such that g (a) = yi . unionsq
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Lemma 5.2 (Tijs and Koster 1998)12 Let P = (q, C) ∈ P S. For each x ∈ [0, q(S)]
there is Tx ⊂ [0, q(S)] such that C∗P (x) =
∫
Tx C
′(t) dt and λ(Tx ) = x. The sets can
be taken such that x ≤ y ⇒ Tx ⊆ Ty.
Lemma 5.3 For any cost sharing problem P = (q, C) ∈ P S and each y ∈
CORE∗(P) there exists a partition {U1,U2, . . . ,U|S|} of [0, q(S)] such that for all
i ∈ S it holds that




C ′(t) dt = yi .
Proof First of all, we claim that for any P = (q, C) ∈ P S, y ∈ CORE∗(P) and i ∈ S
there is a λ-measurable set T ⊆ [0, q(S)] with the following properties:




C ′(t) dt = yi ,
(i i i) y−i ∈ CORE∗(q−i , CT ).
This is seen as follows. According to Lemma 5.1 there is an interval [a, a + qi ] ⊆
[0, q(S)] such that yi = C∗P (a + qi ) − C∗P (a). Consider a family of measurable sets{Tz}z∈[0,q(S)] as in Lemma 5.2 and define T = Ta+qi \ Ta . Then
∫
T C
′(t) dt = yi and
λ (T ) = qi . Let P˜ = (q−i , CT ). Since y ∈ CORE∗(P) it holds for all V ⊆ S\{i} that
y (V ∪ {i}) ≤ C∗P (q (V ∪ {i})), so




C ′(t) dt −
∫
T






















(CT )′ (t) dt
∣




= (CT )∗P (q (V )) .





. This proves our claim. Then by repeated application of this claim
we finish the proof. unionsq
12 Lemma 5.5, p. 156.
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Proof of Lemma 3.4 Coalitional consistency implies consistency, so we need only
show that a consistent mechanism is coalitionally consistent. Let P0 = (q, C0) =
(q, C) ∈ P S, M = {i1, i2, . . . , im} ⊂ S. Define for  ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} , M =
{i1, i2, . . . , i}. Let y = μ (P), then by repeated application of consistency with
respect to agents i1, i2, . . . , im we are assured of the existence of reduction map-




P S\M where C = (C−1)ϕ,−i , and y−M = μ (P). So in particular we get
y = μ (P) ⇒ y−M = μ (q−M , Cm).
Now we are done by defining a reduction mappingϕ∗ for (μ, P) such that Cϕ∗,−M =











i , where 
∗
i is the primitive of ϕ
∗
i such that
∗i (0) = 0.
As a first step, define
ϕ∗i1 := ϕ1i1 .
By virtue of ϕ1 it holds that—as long as we see to it that ϕ∗ qualifies as reduction










′(t) dt = μi1(P0),
Cϕ∗,−M1 = C1.











′(t) dt = μi (P) = μi (P0),
Cϕ∗,−M = C.
We will define ϕ∗i p : [0, q(S)] → [0, 1] as follows
ϕ∗i p (t) = ϕ pi p
(
t − F∗p (t)
) (





Denote the primitive of ϕ pi p by 
p
i p . Use the substitution u = t − F∗p (t) and integrate
to get the following property that is needed below
∗i p (t) = pi p (t − F∗p (t)). (13)
First we will show that ϕ∗ is extended in an appropriate way. First of all
q(S)∫
0







t − F∗p (t)
) (








i p (y) dy = qi p ,
by virtue of ϕ pi p . Implicit differentiation in (6) gives












t − F∗p (t)
) (










t − F∗p (t)
) (


















) = μi p
(
q−Mp−1 , C p−1
) = μi p (q, C),
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Now use the definition of ϕ∗i p , the fact that C
′(t) = C ′ϕ∗,−Mp−1(t − F∗p (t)) whenever




1 − ϕ pi p
(
t − F∗p (t)
)) (




t − F∗p (t)
)
dt (14)




1 − ϕ pi p (u)
)





y − F∗p (y) − pi p
(




















ϕ p,−i p = (C p−1)ϕ p,−i p = C p.
Then by inductive reasoning we may complete the definition of a reduction mapping
ϕ∗M so that Cϕ∗,−M ≡ Cm . Complete ϕ∗ by taking for ϕ∗S\M any available reduction
mapping ϕ¯ for (μ, Pm). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3.5 Part 1: This is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.3.
Part 2: Take P = (q, C) ∈ P S and let y = μ(P). If μ is consistent then there is a
reduction map ϕ for (μ, P) such that y−i = μ(q−i , Cϕ,−i ) for all i ∈ S. Take V ⊆ S,











ϕi (t)C ′(t) dt
≤ sup
U⊆XV :λ(U )=q(V )
∫
U




C ′(t) dt =C∗P (q(V )).
But this means that y is in the pessimistic core for P . unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.2 Take μ ∈ M(ADD,CONS). Recall that μ then satisfies CR, so
that by Theorem 4.1 μ = μr for some monotonic rationing method r . Consider a cost
sharing problem P = (q, Bx ) where q ∈ RS+, x ∈ [0, q(S)]. Then μ(q, Bx ) = r(q, x)
by Theorem 4.1. By consistency there is a reduction map ϕ for (μ, P) such that
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μ−i (q, Bx ) = μ(q−i , (Bx )ϕ,−i ) for all i ∈ S. Let i be the primitive of ϕi with
i (0) = 0. Then for y ∈ [0, x]
(Bx )ϕ,−i (y − i (y)) =
y∫
0
(1 − ϕi (t))B ′x (t) dt =
y∫
0
(1 − ϕi (t)) dt = y − i (y).
We may conclude that (Bx )ϕ,−i = Bx−i (x). In particular, since ϕ is a reduction map
for (μ, P), i (x) = μi (q, Bx ) = ri (q, x), so
r−i (q, x) = μ−i (q, Bx ) = μ(q−i , Bx−ri (q,x)) = r(q−i , x − ri (q, x)).
The other direction is straightforward. Take a consistent r and let μ = μr . Define
a reduction map ϕ for (μ, P) as follows: ϕ(t) = ∂
∂t r(q, t) for all t where it exists and
let ϕ(t) be an arbitrary unit vector otherwise. Take i ∈ S and let i be as before, hence
i (y) = ri (q, y) for all y.13 Recall that Cϕ,−i (y − i (y)) =
∫ y
0 (1 − ϕi (t))C ′(t) dt .
Then by application of the chain rule we get
(1 − ϕi (y))(Cϕ,−i )′(y − i (y)) = (1 − ϕi (y))C ′(y).
So whenever ϕi (y) = 1 it holds (Cϕ,−i )′(y − i (y)) = C ′(y). This is just what we
need, then
μr−i (q, C) =
q(S)∫
0
C ′(t) dr−i (q, t) =
q(S)∫
0


















13 Here I use the fact that a monotonic rationing method r is Lipschitz-continuous and—in particular—
absolutely continuous in the resource component t .
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Proof of Proposition 4.6 Suppose μ is consistent, then Theorem 4.2 implies that μ =






h − x Sh−1) + αS (t − x S−1). (15)




r j (q, t) = ∂
∂t
r j (q−i , t − ri (q, t))
= ∂
∂ y








(t − ri (q, t))
= ∂
∂ y






· (1 − αSi )
= ∂
∂ y






· αS (S \ {i}).
Using that αS (S \ {i}) = 0 if and only if x S−1 − ri (q, x S−1) = x S − ri (q, x S ), we
conclude that on (x S−1 − ri (q, x S−1), x S − ri (q, x S )) the derivative of the mapping
y → r(q−i , y) is constant. Now define x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯k and α¯1, α¯2, . . . , α¯k by
x¯ = x S − ri (q, x S ),
α¯ =
{
αS · αS (S \ {i})−1 if αS(S \ {i}) > 0,
0 else.
Then it holds that for all t ∈ [x¯−1, x¯]
r(q−i , t) =
−1∑
h=1
α¯h(x¯h − x¯h−1) + α¯(t − x¯−1).
The definitions of x¯ and α¯ match that of x˜ and α˜ in (10) and (11), because





h − x Sh−1)=
∑
h=1









(1 − αShi )(x Sh − x Sh−1).
Now we will prove the other way around. For all  = 1, 2 . . . , k we may choose a par-
tition (U1,U2, . . . ,U|S|) of [x S−1, x S ] such that (i) λ(Uj ) = αSj (x S − x S−1) and
(ii) ∫Uj C ′(t) dt = αSj (C(x S )−C(x S−1)) for all j ∈ S. To see this, apply Lemma 5.3
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to each of the cost sharing problems (αS(x S − x S−1), C) where C ∈ C is defined by
C(y) := C(y + xS−1) − C(x S−1). Then ϕ defined by ϕ j = IU j for U j = ∪k=1Uj
is a reduction map for (μ, P). Consider a reduction by agent i , then it is easily seen
that (10) and (11) lead to the same cost shares for the agents in S\{i}. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.5 In Example 3.3 strong consistency was shown for μav, so we
only have to show the uniqueness part. So suppose μ is an additive and strongly con-
sistent cost sharing rule, not equal to μav. We show that this leads to contradiction.
Recall that μ satisfies constant returns. Consider a minimal set of agents M for which
there is G = (d, C) ∈ PM with d ∈ RM+ such that μ(G) = μav(G). Let i ∈ M be
such that μi (G) = μavi (G). The agents share the costs, so there must as well be an
agent j ∈ M\{i} with μ j (G) = μavj (G). If it were the case that M = N , then in
particular, by minimality of M , it holds for all S  N that
G∗ ∈ P S ⇒ μ(G∗) = μav (G∗). (16)
By Lemmas 3.5 and 5.3 we can choose a set Ui so that IUi is a reducing map for i . In
addition strong consistency implies μ j (d−i , CUi ) = μavj (d−i , CUi ). For any such set
Ui we conclude, by (16) that
μ j (d, c) = μ j (d−i , CUi ) = μavj (d−i , CUi ) = μavj (d, C),
by strong consistency. But this contradicts with the choice of j , hence M  N .
Now take r with μ = μr as in Theorem 4.1 and denote the derivative of t → r(d, t)
by rˆ . Then, in particular, λ
({
y ∈ [0, d (M)] ∣∣ rˆi (y) = did(M)
})




s ∈ [0, d(M)] ∣∣ rˆi (s) > did(M)
}
and T0 = [0, d(M)]\T1. (17)
Note that λ(T0) > 0 and λ(T1) > 0. Choose another player in the nonempty set N\M ,
say k. Define the demand profile d∗ ∈ RM∪{k}+ such that d∗M = d and d∗k = d(M).
Roughly, the proof proceeds by distinguishing several cases; for each case we define
some cost sharing problem, that is reducible with respect to agent k and such that cost
shares in those reductions depend on the reduction. Then, as a result, a contradiction
with strong consistency remains.





where A = T0 ∪ [d(M), d (M) + λ (T1)]. Distinguish three cases:
Case 1: μk (d∗, C) = 0
Case 2: μk (d∗, C) = d (M)
Case 3: 0 < μk (d∗, C) < d (M)
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Case 1: μk (d∗, C) = 0. For notational convenience use rˆ∗ to denote the derivative of
t → r(d∗, t). Then
rˆ∗k =
{
1 a.e. on T1 ∪ [2d(M) − λ (T0) , 2d(M)] ,
0 a.e. on T0 ∪ [d(M), d(M) + λ (T1)] . (18)
Again we distinguish between several cases:
(a) Almost all first λ(T0) levels are in T0.
(b) Almost all first λ(T1) levels are in T1.
(c) Not case (a), nor (b).





where A = T0 ∪ [2d(M) − λ (T0) , 2d(M)]. Then μk
(
d∗, C¯
) = λ (T0) by (18).




by agent k in two
ways, such that the corresponding cost shares of agent i differ. To see this con-
sider the two reductions (d, C¯U ) with U = [0, d(M)], and (d, C¯W ) with W =
[d(M), 2d(M)].
In Case 1(a), if almost all first λ (T0) levels are in T0, then λ ([0, λ (T0)] ∩ T0) =
λ (T0).
(i) If λ(T1) ≤ λ(T0), then











(ii) If λ(T1) > λ(T0), then
































In Case 1(b), if almost all first λ (T1) levels are in T1, or equivalently
























• Case 1 (c): The first levels are not all of type T0 nor of type T1, in λ-sense. Consider




































rˆi (s)ds < 0,
contradicting consistency.
Case 2: μk (d∗, C) = d(M). Then
rˆ∗k =
{
0 a.e. on T1 ∪ [2d(M) − λ (T0) , 2d(M)] ,
1 a.e. on T0 ∪ [d(M), d(M) + λ (T1)] . (20)
Distinguish the following two cases
(a) Almost all first λ(T1) levels are in T1.
(b) Not all first λ(T1) levels are in T1.
• Case 2 (a): λ (T1 ∩ [0, λ (T1)]) = λ (T1). Consider the cost function C¯ as previ-
ously defined in (19). It holds that μk
(
d∗, C¯
) = λ (T0) by (20). Then reductions by
agent k are defined by (d, C¯U ) with U = [0, λ (T1)] ∪ [d(M) + λ (T1) , 2d(M)] ,
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rˆi (s)ds > 0,
contradicting consistency.
• Case 2 (b): Suppose that not almost all first λ (T1) production levels are in T1.




IA(s)ds, where A = T1 ∪ [d(M) + λ (T1) − , d(M) + λ (T1)] .




= . Now consider the following two








, where U = [d(M), 2d(M)] and















rˆi (s)ds > 0,
contradicting strong consistency.










k (s)ds = 0.
• Case 3 (a): ∫
T0




I A(s)ds, where A = T0 ∪ [d(M), d(M) + α]
Then the function f : α → μk (d∗, Cα)−α is continuous on [0, d(M)]. Moreover







rˆ∗k (s)ds > 0, and




− d(M) ≤ 0.






(a.1) First, assume that almost all T1 levels are at the end of the interval [0, d(M)],
which means that λ (T1 ∩ [λ (T0) , d(M)]) = λ (T1). Then one reduction by
agent k is defined by (d, CβW ) for W = [d(M), 2d(M)]. Another is (d, CβU )
for U = [0, t] ∪ [d(M) + t, 2d(M)] and t = min {λ (T0) , λ (T1) , β}. By def-
inition of t it holds λ ([d(M) − t, d(M)] ∩ T0) = 0, i.e. almost all production
levels in the interval [d(M) − t, d(M)] are in T1. Then notice that CβW (y) =∫ y











(a.2) Assume not almost all first λ (T1) levels are in T1, or λ (T1 ∩ [0, λ (T0)]) <
λ (T1). Then there exists y ∈ (0, λ (T1)) such that λ ([0, y] ∩ T0) > 0. Write
Y = [0, y]∩T0. Note that μk(d∗, Cβ) = β. Consider the reduction by agent k,
(d, CβU ) and (d, C
β
W ) with U = Y ∪ [d(M) + λ(Y ), 2d(M)] and W =[d(M),
2d(M)], respectively. Then μi (d, CβW )−μi (d, CβU ) > 0, contradicting strong
consistency.
Case 3 (b): Suppose that ∫T0 rˆ∗k (s)ds = 0. Then in particular μk (d∗, C) ≤ λ (T1).
Then there are two cases:
(b.1) μi (d∗, C) = λ(T1)
(b.2) μi (d∗, C) < λ(T1)
(b.1) Suppose that μk (d∗, C) = λ (T1). Then obviously one reduction by agent k is
specified by (d, CA)with A = [d(M), 2d(M)]. Define q = min {λ (T0) , λ (T1)}.
Assume that all firstλ (T0)production levels are in T0, i.e.λ ([0, λ (T0)] ∩ T0) =
λ (T0). Then (d, CB) with B = [0, q] ∪ [d(M) + q, 2d(M)] defines another
reduction by agent k. Observe that in this reduced cost function all lev-
els in [d(M) − q, d(M)] have marginal costs 1, which are almost all con-
tained in T1. So μi (d, CA) < μi (d, CB) , contradicting SCONS. Hence,
assume that not almost all first λ (T0) production levels are in T0. Then there
exists y ∈ (0, λ(T0)) such that λ([0, y] ∩ T1) > 0. Let Y =[0, y] ∩ T1 and
U = Y ∪ [d(M) + λ(Y ), 2d(M)]. Then (d, CU ) constitutes another reduction
by agent k such that—similar to Case 3 (a.2)—μi (d, CU ) > μi (d, CA), con-
tradiction.




∣ rˆ∗k (s)= 0
})
> 0 would
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Then it holds 0 < μk
(
d∗, C¯
) ≤ λ (T1). Suppose that almost all T0 production
levels are at the beginning. Define sets
U = [0, λ (T0) + μk
(
d∗, C¯












Then (d, C¯U ) and (d, C¯V ) are reductions from (d∗, C¯) by agent k. Note that in the




levels with marginal cost 1 are in
T1. So this means that here agent i is strictly worse off than in the first case where
λ (T1) − μk (d∗, C) marginal cost levels 1 are in T0, or μi (d, C¯U ) < μi (d, C¯V )—
contradiction. So it can not happen that almost all first productions levels are in T0.




IA(s)ds, with A = T1 ∪ [d(M) − α, d(M)] , and
consider the function f : α → μk
(
d∗, C¯α
) − α. Then f is continuous and








f (d(M)) = μk
(
d∗, C¯d(M)
) − d(M) < 0.
So, there is β ∈ (0, d(M)) such that μk
(
d∗, C¯β
) = β. If almost all first λ (T1) pro-








with U = [d(M) − β, 2d(M) − β], W = [λ (T1) − , λ (T1)] ∪ [d(M), 2d(M) − ]
and where  ∈ (0, min {λ (T1) , β}). Then in the first reduction almost all marginal
cost levels 1 are in T1. In the second reduction there are  less in T1 and  more in
T0. Then this means that μi (d, C¯βU ) > μi (d, C¯
β
W ), contradiction. The case where not
almost all first λ (T1) production levels are in T1 is treated analogously to Case 3 (a.2):




whereas another can be found with a cost function
with less marginal cost levels 1 in T1. unionsq
Lemma 5.4 μ ∈ M(ADD,CR,ET) if and only if
(i) μ is generated by a rationing method r, i.e., μ = μr ,
(ii) if for q ∈ RS+, qi = q j for some i, j ∈ S, then ri (q, ·) = r j (q, ·).
Proof The combination of properties ADD, CR implies the functional representation
as in Theorem 4.1. Now suppose there is q ∈ RS+ and i, j ∈ S with qi = q j but not
ri (q, ·) = r j (q, ·), and an interval U ⊂ [0, q(S)] such that dri (q, ·) < dr j (q, ·) on U .
Consider C ∈ C defined by C(y) = ∫ y0 IU (t) dt for all y ∈ R+. Then μi (q, C) =∫ q(S)
0 IU (t)dri (q, t) <
∫ q(S)
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